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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
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 This appeal raises an issue of contract interpretation 
which has important consequences to the parties and the citizens 
of Passaic County, New Jersey.  The Passaic County Utilities 
Authority (PCUA or the Authority) finds itself confronted with 
two written contracts it executed with different parties for the 
disposal of solid waste during substantially the same period of 
time.  Finding the later contract more attractive, PCUA claims 
the earlier contract is unenforceable because the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy (DEP) did not 
grant the required approval.   
 Chambers Development Company, Inc. (Chambers), a 
Pennsylvania corporation, entered into two interrelated 
contracts0 in 1987 with PCUA for Passaic County's waste disposal 
over a fifteen year period.  On August 5, 1992, the Authority 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Empire Sanitary 
Fill, Inc. (Empire), another Pennsylvania corporation, for the 
disposal of Passaic County's solid waste for the next fifteen 
years.  This prompted Chambers to bring this diversity action in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania seeking an injunction enjoining the Authority, inter 
alia, from entering into a waste disposal agreement with Empire 
in abrogation of its waste disposal contract with Chambers.   
 In November 1992, the district court granted Chambers a 
permanent injunction, requiring the Authority, unless directed to 
                     
0The parties frequently refer to these contracts as a two-part 
contract.  The contracts provide that they are to be interpreted 
in accordance with the law of New Jersey. 
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the contrary by DEP, to continue operating under the terms and 
conditions of its contract with Chambers for waste disposal.  The 
injunctive order, however, further provided that it should not be 
construed to restrict any of the parties in proceeding before DEP 
to seek approval or disapproval "of any primary long-term plan 
for the disposal of municipal solid waste by the PCUA."  In 
December 1993, the Authority submitted the Empire MOU to DEP for 
approval.0  Ultimately, after a lapse of nine months, DEP 
approved Empire as the primary disposal agent for PCUA.   
 On January 25, 1993, Chambers filed a motion for 
summary judgment asserting that the Authority had breached its 
contract with Chambers by approving the MOU with Empire and 
sought damages.  The Authority opposed the motion.  The parties 
and the court then plunged into a procedural miasma which is 
virtually impenetrable.  After Chambers filed its summary 
judgment motion, the district court referred the matter to a 
magistrate judge who issued a report recommending that the 
district court grant summary judgment to the Authority "on 
plaintiff Chambers' motion for summary judgment," although the 
Authority never moved for summary judgment.   
 On June 29, 1994, the district court issued an order 
denying Chambers' motion for summary judgment, entering judgment 
on Chambers' claim for damages in favor of the Authority and 
                     
0The Authority petitioned DEP specifically for approval of the 
Empire contract.  However, it did not do so with the earlier 
Chambers contract.  As to it, the Authority sought to have DEP 
approve Passaic County's Amended Solid Waste Disposal Plan so as 
to permit it to implement the Chambers contract. 
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adopting the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation as the 
opinion of the court.  The court then directed the parties to 
regard this order as a "final decision."  Neither the magistrate 
judge nor the district court notified Chambers that they were 
considering granting summary judgment against Chambers or 
afforded Chambers an opportunity to present pertinent evidence in 
opposition to summary judgment. 
 On July 13, 1994, Chambers moved, pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 59, to amend the district court's June 29, 1994 judgment 
to direct a hearing to determine whether PCUA breached its duty 
of good faith performance for its contract with Chambers.  The 
court denied the motion.  Chambers appealed to this court from 
the order of the district court denying its motion to amend the 
judgment.  We vacate and remand. 
I. 
 The waste disposal contracts executed between Chambers 
and PCUA in 1987 consisted of a short-term agreement and a long-
term agreement.  The short-term agreement covered the period 1987 
to 1992, while the long-term agreement stretched from 1992 to 
2002.  Although we see no such provision in the agreements, and 
we are referred to none, it is undisputed that DEP had to approve 
the amendment to the Passaic County District Solid Waste 
Management Plan designating Chambers as the primary landfill 
system for Passaic County's waste disposal before the contract 
between Chambers and the Authority became enforceable.  N.J.S.A. 
13:1E1-29b.  The Authority and Chambers performed the short-term 
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contract without incident.  The long-term agreement, however, is 
at issue in these proceedings.   
 Several months prior to the December 1, 1992 starting 
date of the long-term agreement, the Authority began negotiating 
with Empire for the disposal of Passaic County waste.  These 
negotiations resulted in Empire and the Authority signing the 
Memorandum of Understanding on August 5, 1992 providing that 
Empire would dispose of Passaic County waste for the next fifteen 
years.  Chambers' injunctive action followed. 
 On appeal, Chambers and the Authority both treat the 
district court's order denying Chambers' motion for summary 
judgment as one granting summary judgment to the Authority on the 
breach of contract issue.  However, the district court did not 
grant summary judgment to the Authority on the contract issue, 
although it did enter judgment for the Authority on the question 
of damages.0  The magistrate judge's opinion, adopted by the 
district court, does not address every aspect of Chambers' 
motion.  The district court essentially entered summary judgment 
on the claim for damages to a non-moving party without addressing 
all of the issues raised by Chambers.  We will not review an 
order denying a motion for summary judgment.  See, e.g., Hart v. 
Overseas Nat. Airways, Inc., 541 F.2d 386, 394 (3d Cir. 1976). 
                     
0The district court order states that Chambers' "motion for 
summary judgment is denied, and judgment on [Chambers'] claim for 
damages is entered in favor of the [Authority]." 
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However, we will review the court's order entering judgment for 
the Authority on the issue of damages because it is "final."0 
II. 
 The district court provides no explanation or 
justification for entering judgment for the Authority on the 
damages question.  Presumably, the court concluded as a matter of 
law that the Authority had not breached its contract with 
Chambers and therefore Chambers was not entitled to any damages. 
This constitute both procedural0 and substantive error. 
 A party must perform a legal contract unless that 
performance is excused for a valid reason; failure to perform is 
a breach.  11 Williston on Contracts § 1290 (3d ed. 1968).  The 
contract between Chambers and the Authority was a valid contract 
when signed in 1987.  However, both parties agree that the 
contract was subject to approval by DEP of Passaic County's 
amended solid waste plan.  DEP did not approve Passaic's 
                     
0The district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332.  This court has appellate 
jurisdiction over the district court's final order under 28 
U.S.C. section 1291. 
0Although authority has developed to allow a court to grant 
summary judgment to a non-moving party, see American Flint Glass 
Workers Union v. Beaumont Glass Co., No. 94-3307 ((3d Cir. 1995); 
Viger v. Commercial Ins. Co., 707 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1983), a 
judgment cannot be entered without first placing the adversarial 
party on notice that the court is considering a sua sponte 
summary judgment motion.  The court must also provide the party 
with an opportunity to present relevant evidence in opposition to 
that motion.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986); 
Lutz v. York, 899 F.2d 255, 258 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990).  The court 
did neither in this case.  Moreover, the Authority never 
attempted to show that it merited summary judgment because it was 
opposing Chambers' motion, not supporting a motion of its own. 
Additionally, there are numerous issues of fact which preclude a 
grant of summary judgment here. See text infra. 
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amendment for its long-term waste disposal designating Chambers' 
landfill system for the 1992-2002 period.  Rather, it approved 
the designation of Chambers as a component of Passaic County's 
contingency waste disposal plan.0 
 Chambers first contends that DEP's contingent approval 
of the plan made them the exclusive out-of-state disposal 
facility for Passaic County waste, subject only to the 
development of in-state alternatives.  It points to the following 
passages from the various DEP approval memoranda to support its 
argument. 
The New Jersey Advisory Council on Solid 
Waste Management commented that although 
Passaic County has secured disposal space, 
the county remains wholly dependant on out-
of-state disposal.  [DEP] specifically 
addresses this comment by approving the 
interim arrangements for out-of state 
disposal and authorizing modified approval of 
the longer term arrangement as an integral 
component of Passaic County's solid waste 
contingency plan. June 24, 1987 
Certification. 
 
However, [DEP] is unable to approve the 
[Chambers] arrangement as the primary 
landfilling system for the disposal of 
[waste].  N.J.S.A. 13:1E-21(b)3 places a 
legal obligation on each district to plan for 
sufficient available suitable in-county 
disposal sites.  . . . the division maintains 
that the only solution to the long-term 
disposal needs of Passaic County is the 
development of in-county facilities or to 
secure interdistrict agreement with other New 
Jersey counties.  In light of these factors, 
and the extent that Passaic County has failed 
                     
0DEP stated that: "In place of approving the primary long-term 
use of the [Chambers] arrangement, [DEP] has modified the 
amendment to reflect approval of the long-term use of these 
facilities as a component of Passaic County's Contingency Plan." 
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to meet its planning obligations pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 13:1E-21(b)3, [DEP] cannot approve 
primary dependance upon out-of-state residual 
disposal capacity for the period 1993 to 
2002. June 24, 1987 Certification. 
 
[W]ithin forty-five days of the date of this 
certification, Passaic County is directed to 
submit the remainder of its solid waste 
contingency plan in plan amendment form for 
state level review . . . .  More 
specifically, the remainder of the plan 
should address in-county residual landfill 
development, the development of interdistrict 
agreements on an interim/emergency basis, and 
the identification of alternate landfilling 
options. June 24, 1987 Certification. 
 
 Chambers also refers to the following DEP memoranda: 
 
As such, Passaic County currently has no 
disposal plan in place and the long-term use 
of out-of-state disposal was authorized only 
within the context of contingency plan backup 
use as stated within [DEP's] September 1, 
1987 certification. April 1, 1992 
Certification. 
 
The Continued failure on the part of the 
County to enter into a regional in-state 
disposal agreement or to identify and develop 
in-county capacity is a serious plan 
deficiency. . . .  April 1, 1992 
Certification. 
 
 Conversely, the Authority maintains that DEP's 
contingent approval of the plan amendment permitted it to replace 
Chambers with any waste disposal alternatives.  In support, it 
also cites the following DEP memoranda:  
[T]he remainder of the plan should address 
in-county residual landfill development, the 
development of interdistrict agreements on an 
interim/emergency basis, and the 
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identification of alternate landfilling 
options. June 24, 1987 Certification.0 
 
The remaining Long Term Agreement was merely 
a contingent arrangement which, for [DEP] 
purposes, never took effect.  October 7, 1993 
Certification. 
 
[DEP] has consistently maintained the 
position that the second phase of the 
Chambers Agreement was approved for 
contingency purposes only, . . . .  Judge 
Smith recognized the ability of [DEP] to 
abrogate a portion of the Chambers agreement, 
should more acceptable alternatives be 
presented, although noting that at the time 
the Memorandum Order was issued, [DEP] had 
not yet taken any action to supplant the 
contingent portion of the Chambers agreement. 
. . . [DEP] is now taking that step by 
approving, in modified form, an agreement 
which better suits the needs of the public 
and the goals of [DEP].  October 7, 1993 
Certification. 
 
 These extensive quotations provide support for both 
parties' contentions regarding the scope of DEP's contingent plan 
approval, but they do not resolve the issue before the court 
pertaining to the enforceability of the Chambers long-term 
agreement.  The district court never addressed this issue.   
 The court did consider DEP's contingent plan approval 
sufficient to justify enforcing the Chambers contract in the 
absence of DEP approval of some other plan.0  The court, however, 
                     
0Chambers emphasizes the full text of this passage, while the 
Authority looks only to the last clause. 
0The court stated in its November 20, 1992 Memorandum that: 
"Because use of the Chambers' landfill is approved as a 
contingency, and because [DEP] has approved no other plan for 
disposal of solid waste in the 1992-2002 period, the PCUA is 
obligated both under its Long-Term Agreement and under New Jersey 
state law to continue to use Chambers' landfills."   
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did not resolve specifically whether DEP's original approval in 
1987 made Chambers the exclusive out-of-state waste disposal 
company for Passaic County waste after December 1, 1992, should 
PCUA fail to develop in-state waste disposal facilities.  Nor did 
it address whether the Authority could seek a DEP order 
authorizing it to use an alternative out-of-state waste disposal 
facility without violating its contract with Chambers.0  
 Chambers next claims that the Authority itself acted as 
if it expected Chambers' landfills to accept Passaic County waste 
for the "long-term" period of the agreement.  Chambers maintains 
that the Authority commissioned reports to determine whether 
Chambers had the capacity to fulfill its obligations to the 
Authority for the entire period of the long-term agreement.  For 
example, the July 1991 Alaimo Capacity and Monitory Report of the 
Chambers' landfills commissioned by the Authority, treats the 
Chambers agreement as providing for disposal of Passaic County 
waste for the duration of the long-term agreement.  Chambers 
argues that this report demonstrates that the Authority expected 
to use Chambers for waste disposal after the short-term contract 
expired.  The Authority does not address this issue on appeal. 
 Additionally, neither party discusses the complaint 
filed by the Authority on September 9, 1992, in the Superior 
                     
0DEP has deferred to the courts for resolution of this issue. In 
its October 7, 1993 Certification, DEP specifically notes that: 
"Chambers has filed a damages claim in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  [Thus], it is in a position to be made whole if 
the approval of the Empire Agreement is ruled an event under the 
Chambers contract which entitles Chambers to its contractual 
damages." October, 7, 1993 Certification.  
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Court of New Jersey Law Division, but the complaint lends further 
support to Chambers' arguments.  In the action against Chambers, 
Empire, and DEP, the Authority noted that on June 14, 1987, 
Passaic County adopted a plan amendment which called for reliance 
upon the Chambers agreements as the County's primary landfill 
disposal system from December 1, 1987, through the year 2002. The 
complaint also alleged that due to changes in market conditions, 
"the PCUA has now determined that it can save its citizens and 
ratepayers substantial sums of money after 1992" by entering into 
the MOU with Empire.   
 The Authority, therefore, brought an action for a 
declaratory judgment declaring, inter alia, (1) that PCUA is not 
liable to Chambers for failure to perform under the License 
Agreements after 1992 if such performance is due to existence of 
a later-approved primary disposal alternative; (2) declaring that 
PCUA may terminate its License Agreements with Chambers upon 
payment of exclusive recovery damages in accordance with section 
9.3 of the contract; and (3) restraining Chambers from 
interfering with PCUA's obligation to secure contractual 
arrangements to provide safe, adequate, and economical services 
to its ratepayers and citizens.  This complaint suggests that the 
Authority believed that its contract with Chambers was 
enforceable.    
 Finally, Chambers contends that the Authority violated 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by entering into the 
Empire contract and submitting it to DEP for approval and that 
this precludes entering summary judgment in the Authority's 
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favor.0  Under New Jersey law, every contract contains a covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing which provides that "neither party 
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or 
injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of 
the contract . . . ."  Bak-A-Lum Corp. of America v. Alcoa Bldg. 
Products, Inc., 351 A.2d 349, 352 (N.J. 1976) (citations omitted, 
quotation omitted).  The Authority does not dispute this. 
 However, the magistrate judge considered only whether 
the implied covenant of good faith obligated the Authority to 
"repeatedly resubmit" the Chambers plan to DEP for approval.  He 
completely ignored the district court's injunction which provided 
that the Authority "shall continue operating under the terms and 
conditions of the Long-Term Agreement" in its waste disposal 
unless directed to the contrary by a valid DEP order.   
 Moreover, neither the district court nor the magistrate 
judge addressed the Authority's possible bad faith by 
affirmatively entering into a contract with Empire and actively 
seeking DEP approval for that contract.0  Whether the Authority 
violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by entering 
                     
0Chambers also argues that the 1993 DEP approval of the Empire 
contract does not justify the Authority's breach because DEP did 
not accord Chambers sufficient process.  We reject this argument. 
DEP is a state administrative agency which is not a party to this 
action.  Moreover, under New Jersey law, Chambers could have 
appealed the DEP decision to the Appellate Division of the New 
Jersey Superior Court. N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3. 
0Affirmatively attempting to avoid the terms of a contract 
appears to be a violation of the covenant of good faith in New 
Jersey. Cf. Leadership Real Estate v. Harper, 638 A.2d 173, 191 
(N.J.Super. 1993); Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 579 A.2d 1252, 
1257-62 (N.J.Super. 1990); Bak-A-Lum Corp. of America, 351 A.2d 
at 352. 
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into the waste disposal contract with Empire, or by seeking DEP 
approval for it, is critical to the resolution of the Chambers 
contract claim and the related request for damages. 
 The district court commented in its memorandum order 
that had there been evidence in the record to support Chambers' 
counsel's assertion that the Authority as late as 1992 indicated 
that the contract would be performed on a long-term basis, it 
would have found that New Jersey precedent "required a hearing 
into whether the PCUA breached a duty of good faith performance 
of its contract with Chambers."  The court concluded after 
reviewing the record that whether PCUA breached its duty of good 
faith to Chambers "is purely one of law, which the magistrate 
judge adequately analyzed." 
 As we pointed out above, the magistrate judge did not 
adequately analyze all of the issues raised by Chambers. 
Additionally, there is considerable evidence of record which 
warrants an evidentiary hearing and precludes a disposition of 
this appeal as a simple question of law.  Passaic County on June 
24, 1987, amended its approved district solid waste management 
plan to include the Chambers landfill system as the primary 
landfill for the disposal of the County's solid waste.  As we 
have already noted, the amendment was rejected and modified in 
part with respect to the waste disposal for the period 1992 to 
2002.  DEP thereupon "modified the amendment to reflect approval 
of the long-term use of these facilities as a component of 
Passaic County's Contingency Plan."  DEP never nullified the 
Chambers contract.  The 1987 directive dealt with the Authority's 
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waste disposal plan and its certification addressed the plan. Any 
effort to change, modify, or rescind that contract remained the 
responsibility of the parties.  Apparently, the contract remained 
unchanged. 
 Therefore, the obligation to comply with DEP's 
instruction regarding long-term waste disposal remained with 
PCUA.  Judge Stapleton, in his concurrence, believes that on this 
record the Authority, had it filed a motion, would have been 
entitled to summary judgment.  We do not decide the merits of the 
underlying dispute, however, because there are unresolved 
material issues of fact regarding the Authority's obligations 
under the Chambers unaltered and unrescinded long-term agreement 
which can only be resolved by an evidentiary hearing.  Besides, 
on a motion for summary judgment Chambers would have been 
entitled to the benefit of all inferences.  
 The long-term agreement contained no express provision 
requiring that it be subject to approval of DEP.  The contract, 
however, could not be implemented unless DEP approved the amended 
county plan.  Not having approved the Authority's plan in toto, 
DEP's 1987 enigmatic contingency certification relating to the 
long-term waste disposal left the meaning of the Chambers long-
term contract susceptible to more than one interpretation.  Did 
the certification mean that the Chambers contract would be 
effective in all its terms in the event PCUA failed to develop 
in-state waste disposal options?  Or did it mean the 
certification effectively rendered the long-term agreement a 
nullity permitting it to be replaced at the will and whimsy of 
15 
the Authority?  This ambiguity creates questions of fact 
susceptible to more than one meaning which preclude summary 
judgment.  Therefore, extrinsic evidence that objectively will 
illuminate its meaning, especially the conduct of the parties, 
will be helpful.  In 1987, the Authority submitted its solid 
waste plan to DEP for amendment as required by state statute so 
that DEP could determine whether the contract conformed to the 
amended plan.  DEP rejected the plan amendment (not the 
contract), not because of the intrinsic provisions of the 
contract, but because the amendment did not provide for in-county 
waste disposal facilities after the expiration of the Chambers 
short-term agreement.0   
          The concurrence states (typescript at 2) that the 
Authority "at the DEP's direction, took a fresh look at the 
                     
0New Jersey, under its Solid Waste Management Act (Act), 
established a statutory framework within which all solid waste 
collection, disposal, and utilization activity in the state could 
be controlled.  In re Long-Term Out-of-State Waste Disposal 
Agreement etc., 568 A.2d 547, 549 (N.J. Super.), cert. denied, 
583 A.2d 337 (1990); N.J.S.A. 13:1E-2(b)(1).  "It sought to 
regulate such activity by means of a comprehensive state and 
regional planning program."  568 A.2d at 549.  To accomplish this 
goal, each of the counties in the state was required to develop a 
solid waste management plan.  Passaic County developed such a 
plan and apparently created the Authority to implement it.  The 
Act directed DEP to review each county's waste disposal plan 
according to statewide objectives, criteria, and standards and to 
approve, modify, or reject each county plan. 
 
In 1975, New Jersey amended the Act in an effort to ensure that 
all contracts relating to solid waste disposal conformed to the 
applicable solid waste disposal plan.  The Act provided that any 
contract entered into after the effective date of the Act must 
conform to the applicable provisions "of the approved solid waste 
management plan of the relevant solid waste management district 
or unless such contract is approved by the Commissioner." 
N.J.S.A. 13:1E-29b. 
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available options" in 1992.  We can see nothing in DEP's 1987 
certification of the Authority's plan amendment that amounted to 
a directive permitting it to take a fresh look at options in 
1992.  The 1987 directive rejected the district plan's 
designation of Chambers for waste disposal during the long-term 
period, but modified the plan to include Chambers as a component 
of the Authority's contingency plan.  It also directed Passaic 
County within forty-five days of the date of certification to 
submit for state level review its plan, inter alia, for inter-
district agreements on an interim emergency basis "and the 
identification of alternative landfilling options."   
 During the forty-five day period or the five-year 
period following the execution of the long-term agreement, the 
Authority did nothing to rescind, modify, or alter its agreement 
with Chambers.  However, just prior to the expiration of the 
short-term agreement, it negotiated a long-term agreement with 
Empire because "PCUA has now determined that it can save its 
citizens and rate payers substantial sums of money after 1992."0  
Did the Authority's passivity over the five years evince an 
acquiescence in the Chambers long-term agreement?0 
                     
0The concurrence attaches some significance to DEP's 1993 
approval of the Empire contract.  This approval had no effect on 
the Authority's obligations under the Chambers long-term 
contract.  DEP's approval of the Empire contract signifies only 
that the Empire contract conforms to the New Jersey waste 
disposal plan. 
0The 1987 certification instructed the Authority to renegotiate 
any contracts to bring them into conformity with DEP's 
modifications to Passaic County's solid waste disposal plan 
within 90 days.  The Authority apparently did not renegotiate the 
Chambers agreement. 
17 
 Praiseworthy as the Authority's desire to save money 
may be, it cannot justify the breach of a valid and enforceable 
contract.  The sanctity of a contract is a fundamental concept of 
our entire legal structure.  Freedom of contract includes the 
freedom to make a bad bargain.  "It is a fundamental principle of 
contract law, therefore, that, wise or not, a deal is a deal." 
Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(quoting United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Lucky Stores, 
Inc., 806 F.2d 1385, 1386 (9th Cir. 1986)).  Were this not the 
law, no one, including a municipality or authority would be able 
to enter into any long-term contract. 
 On remand, the district court should first determine 
the effect of the 1987 DEP certification on the Chambers long-
term agreement.  In connection, it should ascertain whether the 
Authority evinced an understanding that the Chambers long-term 
agreement was still binding by commissioning the 1991 Alaimo 
report and other similar reports.  It should also determine as a 
fact the Authority's purpose in filing its complaint in the New 
Jersey State Court and whether it supported Chambers' contention 
that it and the Authority knew they had a binding contract in 
place, subject only to the Authority's compliance with the DEP 
certification.  Finally, the court must factually determine 
whether the Authority was attempting to disengage itself from 
obligations under its long-term contract with Chambers because in 
1992 it could secure a contract with Empire at better prices and 
whether it violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in so doing. 
18 
III. 
 The district court entered summary judgment as a matter 
of law against Chambers with respect to its claim for breach of 
good faith and damages without conducting an evidentiary hearing 
with respect to a number of material issues of fact.  The court 
also impermissibly entered summary judgment for the Authority on 
the damages question.  The court's order adopting the Report and 
Recommendation of the magistrate judge must therefore be vacated. 
The court's judgment in favor of the defendant on Chambers' claim 
for damages will also be vacated.  The case will be remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion, with the privilege to Chambers to amend its complaint to 
enable it to present the case in its current status. 
 Costs taxed to the Authority. 
19 
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CHAMBERS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., ET AL. v. 
PASSAIC COUNTY UTILITIES AUTHORITY,  
No. 94-3475                                   
 
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 I agree that the district court improperly entered summary judgment for a party 
which had not moved for it and, accordingly, that a remand is required.  I take a view of 
this case materially different from that of my colleagues, however. 
 The parties agree, as they must, that the short and long term agreements between 
them were conditioned on DEP approval.  The Authority can effectively commit itself with 
respect to solid waste disposal only if and to the extent that it is authorized by the 
DEP.0  The short term agreement was approved by the DEP.  The long term agreement was 
rejected.  The DEP did, however, approve the Authority's performance of its long term 
agreement with Chambers as a part of a contingency or "back up" plan0 and ordered the 
Authority to formulate and propose an alternative, primary plan.  Performance by the 
Authority of the long term agreement was thus approved only in the absence of an approved 
                     
0
  N.J.S.A. 13:1E-29b.   
0
  The DEP approved "the designation of the Chambers Development Company, Inc. landfill 
system in Pennsylvania and other states as a component of Passaic County's contingency 
plan for the disposal of ash, by-pass, and non-processable waste associated with the 
operation of the [then contemplated] Passaic County resource recovery facility for the 
time the facility is operational until the year 2002."  App. at BA 24.  The resource 
recovery facility was never constructed. 
2 
alternative plan, or stated conversely, the DEP did not sanction performance of the long 
term agreement when an alternative plan suitable to the DEP was in operation.0 
 Contrary to Chambers' assertion, the DEP's directive to the Authority to 
formulate an alternative, more acceptable, plan did not limit the Authority to 
consideration of waste disposal programs involving solely in-state disposal sites.  This 
is apparent both from the text of the DEP's certification and from the fact that the DEP 
subsequently approved a long term plan involving out-of-state waste disposal by Empire.
 When the Authority, at the DEP's direction, took a fresh look at the available 
options, it found an alternative approach that it considered more in keeping with the 
interest of its constituents and that it hoped would be acceptable to the DEP.  As 
directed, it filed a petition with the DEP for approval of a long term solid waste 
management plan.  This plan involved, inter alia, a proposed agreement to send 600-
tons per day of Passaic County's waste to the Bergen County Utilities Authority, an 
interdistrict Agreement with Union County for Passaic's bulky wastes, and a 15 year 
                     
0
  The district court, in its November 1992 decision, correctly read the DEP's 1987 
certification in this way.  Its November 20, 1992, injunction read: 
 
Unless and until directed to the contrary by a valid certification of 
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy, the 
PCUA shall continue operating under the terms and conditions of the 
Long-Term Agreement for the Grant and Acquisition of a License for Ash 
Residue Waste Disposal. Provided, however, that nothing in this Order 
shall be construed as restricting any proceeding by any party before 
the NJDEPE seeking approval or disapproval of any primary long-term 
plan for the disposal of municipal solid waste by the PCUA. 
 
App. at BA 33 (emphasis supplied). 
0
  Thus, the November 20, 1992, injunction made it clear that, despite the long term 
agreement and the 1987 DEP certification, "any party" was free to seek DEP approval "of 
any primary long term plan."  App. at BA 33 (emphasis supplied). 
3 
disposal contract with Empire.  The Empire contract called for out-of-state disposal at a 
site much closer to Passaic County than Chambers' disposal sites and for significantly 
lower disposal rates.  As Chambers acknowledges, the DEP, at least at this point, was 
responsible for considering the economic as well as the environmental aspects of district 
plans. 
 The DEP did not give immediate, unconditional approval to the Authority's long 
term plan.  However, on October 7, 1993, it did approve the Empire Agreement for an 
initial term of two years with a possible renewal for three years.  With respect to this 
and other aspects of the plan, the DEP ordered that further data and analysis be submitted 
and that the Authority continue to seek in-state disposal capacity. 
 It is difficult for me to see how Chambers can complain in this context.  It 
knew that the long term agreement was subject to DEP approval.  It further knew from the 
day of the 1987 certification that it would have no enforceable right to the Authority's 
waste if the Authority could come up with a means of disposal that the DEP found 
preferable to the arrangement with it.  If Chambers did not like its position after the 
1987 certification and felt, understandably, that the approved contingent arrangement was 
fundamentally different from the arrangement to which it had agreed, I am confident that 
no court would have held it bound to the restructured agreement. 
 I find it even more difficult to understand how Chambers can fault the 
Authority.  The Authority submitted the long term agreement to the DEP and pursued it in 
good faith. When its application was rejected and it was ordered to submit an alternative 
primary plan, it did so.  While Chambers argues that the DEP's limited approval of the
4 
Empire agreement was inconsistent with its 1987 certification, that complaint is about the 
DEP, not the Authority.   
 In my view, the district court correctly concluded on the basis of the current 
record that the Authority breached no covenant of the long term agreement, express or 
implied, and that no amount of purported "reliance by Chambers can . . . remove the 
Commission's power to certify another solid waste plan."  App. at BA 31.  
 I find unpersuasive the argument that the Authority breached an implied duty of 
good faith by proposing an operator of an out-of-state site other than Chambers in its 
alternative primary plan.  As the magistrate judge explained, the purpose of New Jersey's 
"good faith covenant" rule is not to impose a duty beyond the original intent of the 
parties, but rather to prevent a party from taking action which frustrates that intent.  
The rule is intended to preserve for a party only "the fruits of the contract."  
Associated Group Life, Inc. v. Catholic War Veterans of U.S., 293 A.2d 382, 384 (N.J. 
1972).  If the Authority, for example, had failed to submit the long term contract to the 
DEP for approval or had prosecuted an application for approval in a manner that caused its 
rejection, the Authority would have breached its covenant of good faith.0  It is 
                     
0
  Chambers relies heavily on Illustration 4 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 245 
(1979): 
 
 A contracts to sell and B to buy A's rights as one of three 
lessees under a mining lease in Indian Lands.  The contract states 
that it is "subject only to approval by the Secretary of the 
Interior," which is required by statute.  B files a request for 
approval but A fails to support B's request by giving necessary 
cooperation.  Approval is denied and A cannot convey his rights.  B 
has a claim against A for total breach of contract. A's breach of his 
duty of good faith and fair dealing contributed materially to the non-
occurrence of the condition, approval by the Secretary of the 
Interior, excusing it. 
5 
undisputed here, however, that the Authority submitted the long term agreement to the DEP 
and was not responsible for its rejection.  To the extent Chambers' complains about the 
Authority, it complains of the Authority's conduct in response to the rejection of the 
long term agreement.  But, as the magistrate judge correctly noted, there is no indication 
in this record that the parties, "when they negotiated the Long-Term Agreement in 1987, 
had any meeting of the minds concerning the action that they would take if the [DEP] 
rejected the agreement as the primary plan and accepted it as a contingent plan only."  
App. at BA 11.  Thus, the conduct of the Authority relied upon by Chambers as a breach of 
the covenant of good faith did not frustrate the intent of the parties at the time of 
contracting. 
 On this record, I believe the Authority, had it filed a motion, would have been 
entitled to summary judgment.  It did not so move, however, and Chambers accordingly had 
no obligation to build a record in opposition to the Authority's theory of the case.
therefore concur in the court's judgment remanding this case for further proceedings. 
                     
0
  Chambers litigated its motion primarily on the theory that the legal effect of the long 
term agreement and the 1987 DEP certification was to make it the exclusive supplier of 
out-of-state disposal services for the 15 years of the contract.  It tendered no evidence, 
if any there be, regarding a mutual expectation of what would occur in the event the DEP 
rejected their arrangement as presented. 
